Unlike some other hatchbacks that will be departing the US market, I don’t predict anyone pouring one out for the Mitsubishi i-MiEV. The automaker announced will. Directed by James Hawes. With Bruce Greenwood, Joanne Whalley, Kevin McNally, William Hurt. Factual drama exploring the truth behind the space shuttle Challenger's.

Space Shuttle Challenger disaster - Wikipedia. Space Shuttle Challenger disaster.

Space Shuttle. Challenger's smoke plume after its in- flight breakup, resulting in its destruction and the deaths of all seven crew members (memorial service pictured). Date. 28 January 1. Time. 11: 3. 9: 1.

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• Not surprisingly for a car crammed full of people, something possibly less-than-legal may have been going on, since once the wreck happens eight passengers bolt away.

EST (1. 6: 3. 9: 1. UTC)Location. Atlantic Ocean, off the coast of Florida. Outcome. Grounding of the Space Shuttle fleet for nearly three years during which various safety measures, solid rocket booster redesign, and a new policy on management decision- making for future launches were implemented.

Casualties. Inquiries. Rogers Commission. On January 2. 8, 1. NASAshuttle orbiter mission STS- 5. L and the tenth flight of Space Shuttle Challenger (OV- 9. NASA astronauts and two payload specialists.

The spacecraft disintegrated over the Atlantic Ocean, off the coast of Cape Canaveral, Florida, at 1. EST (1. 6: 3. 9 UTC). Disintegration of the vehicle began after an O- ring seal in its right solid rocket booster (SRB) failed at liftoff. The O- ring was not designed to fly under unusually cold conditions as in this launch.

Its failure caused a breach in the SRB joint it sealed, allowing pressurized burning gas from within the solid rocket motor to reach the outside and impinge upon the adjacent SRB aft field joint attachment hardware and external fuel tank. This led to the separation of the right- hand SRB's aft field joint attachment and the structural failure of the external tank. Aerodynamic forces broke up the orbiter. The crew compartment and many other vehicle fragments were eventually recovered from the ocean floor after a lengthy search and recovery operation. The exact timing of the death of the crew is unknown; several crew members are known to have survived the initial breakup of the spacecraft. The shuttle had no escape system,[1][2] and the impact of the crew compartment with the ocean surface was too violent to be survivable.[3]The disaster resulted in a 3.

Rogers Commission, a special commission appointed by United States President. Ronald Reagan to investigate the accident. The Rogers Commission found NASA's organizational culture and decision- making processes had been key contributing factors to the accident,[4] with the agency violating its own safety rules. NASA managers had known since 1. Morton- Thiokol's design of the SRBs contained a potentially catastrophic flaw in the O- rings, but they had failed to address this problem properly. NASA managers also disregarded warnings (an example of "go fever") from engineers about the dangers of launching posed by the low temperatures of that morning, and failed to adequately report these technical concerns to their superiors.

As a result of the disaster, the Air Force decided to cancel its plans to use the Shuttle for classified military satellite launches from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, deciding to use the Titan IV instead. Approximately 1. 7 percent of Americans witnessed the launch live because of the presence of Payload Specialist Christa Mc. Auliffe, who would have been the first teacher in space.

Media coverage of the accident was extensive: one study reported that 8. Americans surveyed had heard the news within an hour of the accident.[5] The Challenger disaster has been used as a case study in many discussions of engineering safety and workplace ethics. O- ring concerns[edit]Each of the Space Shuttle's two Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) was constructed of seven sections, six of which were permanently joined in pairs at the factory. Timecop Full Movie Online Free on this page. For each flight, the four resulting segments were then assembled in the Vehicle Assembly Building at Kennedy Space Center (KSC), with three field joints.

The factory joints were sealed with asbestos- silica insulation applied over the joint, while each field joint was sealed with two rubber O- rings. After the destruction of Challenger, the number of O- rings per field joint was increased to three.)[6] The seals of all of the SRB joints were required to contain the hot, high- pressure gases produced by the burning solid propellant inside, thus forcing them out of the nozzle at the aft end of each rocket. During the Space Shuttle design process, a Mc. Donnell Douglas report in September 1.

While a safe abort was possible after most types of failures, one was especially dangerous: a burnthrough by hot gases of the rocket's casing. The report stated that "if burnthrough occurs adjacent to [liquid hydrogen/oxygen] tank or orbiter, timely sensing may not be feasible and abort not possible", accurately foreshadowing the Challenger accident.[7]Morton Thiokol was the contractor responsible for the construction and maintenance of the shuttle's SRBs.

As originally designed by Thiokol, the O- ring joints in the SRBs were supposed to close more tightly due to forces generated at ignition, but a 1. This phenomenon, known as "joint rotation," caused a momentary drop in air pressure. This made it possible for combustion gases to erode the O- rings. In the event of widespread erosion, a flame path could develop, causing the joint to burst—which would have destroyed the booster and the shuttle.[8]Engineers at the Marshall Space Flight Center wrote to the manager of the Solid Rocket Booster project, George Hardy, on several occasions suggesting that Thiokol's field joint design was unacceptable.

For example, one engineer suggested that joint rotation would render the secondary O- ring useless, but Hardy did not forward these memos to Thiokol, and the field joints were accepted for flight in 1. Evidence of serious O- ring erosion was present as early as the second space shuttle mission, STS- 2, which was flown by Columbia. Contrary to NASA regulations, the Marshall Center did not report this problem to senior management at NASA, but opted to keep the problem within their reporting channels with Thiokol. Even after the O- rings were redesignated as "Criticality 1"—meaning that their failure would result in the destruction of the Orbiter—no one at Marshall suggested that the shuttles be grounded until the flaw could be fixed.[9]After the 1. STS- 4. 1- D, flown by Discovery, the first occurrence of hot gas "blow- by" was discovered beyond the primary O- ring.

In the post- flight analysis, Thiokol engineers found that the amount of blow- by was relatively small and had not impinged upon the secondary O- ring, and concluded that for future flights, the damage was an acceptable risk. However, after the Challenger disaster, Thiokol engineer Brian Russell identified this event as the first "big red flag" regarding O- ring safety.[1. By 1. 98. 5, with seven of nine shuttle launches that year using boosters displaying O- ring erosion and/or hot gas blow- by,[1. Marshall and Thiokol realized that they had a potentially catastrophic problem on their hands. Perhaps most concerning was the launch of STS- 5.

B in April 1. 98. Challenger, in which the worst O- ring damage to date was discovered in post- flight analysis. The primary O- ring of the left nozzle had been eroded so extensively that it had failed to seal, and for the first time hot gases had eroded the secondary O- ring.[1. They began the process of redesigning the joint with three inches (7. This tang would grip the inner face of the joint and prevent it from rotating. They did not call for a halt to shuttle flights until the joints could be redesigned, but rather treated the problem as an acceptable flight risk.

For example, Lawrence Mulloy, Marshall's manager for the SRB project since 1. Thiokol even went as far as to persuade NASA to declare the O- ring problem "closed".[9]Donald Kutyna, a member of the Rogers Commission, later likened this situation to an airline permitting one of its planes to continue to fly despite evidence that one of its wings was about to fall off.

Pre- launch conditions[edit]Challenger was originally set to launch from KSC in Florida at 1. Eastern Standard Time (EST) on January 2. Delays in the previous mission, STS- 6. C, caused the launch date to be moved to January 2.